HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ANNEX

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

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I. INTRODUCTION

Hazardous materials (HazMat) incidents are common occurrences throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. From simple gasoline spills to major chemical releases, the wide variety and prevalence of HazMats ensures that releases will continue to occur in the future.

Because of their frequency, most municipalities and the responders that serve them are familiar with HazMat incidents and have some capability to isolate, contain, and mitigate a release of hazardous substances. In response to these routine events, the Commonwealth provides oversight and direction in ensuring acceptable levels of cleanup and remediation. Additionally, local governments may request the technical and operational capabilities of the Department of Fire Services Hazardous Materials Response Teams (HMRT). The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) has outlined these actions in a separate document entitled the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP).

For HazMat events in which state resources and assets are needed to directly support response and remediation efforts, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) has established Emergency Support Function 10 (MAESF 10) – Environmental Protection and Hazardous Materials within the Commonwealth's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP). MAESF 10 broadly outlines state action in response to large or complex HazMat incidents and the relationship between state agencies that coordinate resources or provide support.

This annex was created to support the CEMP by further defining the roles and responsibilities of state agencies outlined in MAESF 10, and to provide a framework for state response efforts. This document is intended (1) to bridge the gap between MAESF 10 and HazMat response plans that already exist at the local and regional levels, and (2) to help local and regional planners better understand the capabilities and role of state resources in response to HazMat incidents.

This annex provides introductory information in Section I, presents HazMat threats in Section II, summarizes assumptions in Section III, and outlines the concept of operations in Section IV. References cited in this document are listed in Section V. This introduction describes the purpose of this annex, presents situational statements, discusses the scope of this annex, and outlines the criteria for each response level for a HazMat release.

A. Purpose

The purpose of the Massachusetts HazMat Annex is to ensure situational awareness and outline the operational activities surrounding a state response to a Level 2 or 3 HazMat incident (described in Section D of this introduction) within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The activities conducted by the Commonwealth are intended to support local responders as directed by the Massachusetts CEMP and may include activation of MAESF 10.

This plan is an Annex to the Commonwealth's CEMP and bridges the gap between the broad responsibilities of MAESF 10 and local and regional response plans. While this document addresses aspects of the Commonwealth's response to HazMat releases, it does not supersede or replace the

reporting, response, or remediation requirements placed on a potentially responsible party (RP) by MassDEP and outlined in the MCP.

B. Situation

Below are basic statements describing the situation related to HazMats and HazMat releases throughout the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. These situational statements lend context to planning for a HazMat release.

1. HazMats are an essential building block of modern society and are continuously being used, stored, or transported.

2. Unintentional releases of HazMats occur with varying potential for impacts to public health, safety, property, and the environment.

3. Many HazMat incidents can be handled at the local level where local and regional planning, resources, and expertise are sufficient to mitigate their impact.

4. Depending on the type and scope of the incident, supplemental state resources may be required to assist in a response to a HazMat release.

5. If a HazMat release is the result of a more widespread incident or disaster, state resources may be committed to other aspects of response or events concurrent with the incident.

6. A state HazMat annex is needed to outline response capabilities, resource activation, and assignment prioritization related to a state-level response to one or multiple HazMat releases.

7. Effective response to a major or serious HazMat incident may require outside resources of adjacent counties, cities, states, the federal government, and the private sector.

8. The RP is responsible for immediately notifying the appropriate agencies of a HazMat release.

C. Scope

This annex outlines state action in support of Level 2 or 3 HazMat events, including mobilizing and providing personnel, equipment, supplies, and other resources as required. This annex addresses actions surrounding an initial response and mitigation activities. State participation in long-term monitoring and remediation is governed by the MassDEP MCP.

This annex focuses on coordinating resources for the response aspects of a HazMat incident including accidental releases or instances of dumping/abandonment. This annex does not provide in-depth guidance for dealing with related or coinciding activities such as shelter-in-place, public warning, or evacuation operations. Additionally, the scope of this annex does not extend to off-shore or navigable waters. Intentional releases impacting homeland security are governed by the State Terrorism Incident

Response Plan and require a separate response structure and close involvement with law enforcement and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

D. Response Level Criteria

The following generalized HazMat response level criteria are intended to be broad guidelines. Ultimate responsibility for determining the size, extent, complexity, and response level of any HazMat incident rests with the on-scene Incident Commander.

Level 1 – Controlled Emergency Condition

- Incident that can be controlled by the primary first response agencies of a local jurisdiction
- Single jurisdiction and limited agency involvement
- Does not require evacuation except for the affected structure or facility
- Confined geographic area
- No immediate threat to life, health, or property

Level 2 – Limited Emergency Condition

- Potential threat to life, health, or property
- Expanded geographic scope
- Limited evacuation of nearby residents or facilities
- Involvement of one or more jurisdictions
- Limited participation or mutual aid needed from agencies that do not routinely respond to emergency incidents in the area
- Specialist or technical team is called to the scene
- Combined emergency operations required such as fire fighting and evacuation, or containment and emergency medical care

Level 3 – Full Emergency Condition

- Serious hazard or severe threat to life, health, and property
- Large geographic impact
- Major community evacuation
- Multi-jurisdictional involvement
- State and federal involvement

- Specialists and technical teams deployed
- Extensive resource management and allocation
- Multiple emergency operations

II. THREAT

This section describes the types of HazMat releases (Section A) and vulnerable locations, populations, dates and times, and coinciding events that could be affected by HazMat releases (Section B).

A. RELEASE TYPES

HazMat releases generally fall into one of the three following categories:

1. **Fixed Facility/Storage Incidents** – Most HazMats are either used in the production of other goods and materials or are stored in various quantities at fixed locations. In either case, HazMats are usually adequately marked and identified. Additionally, when present in large quantities or presenting a significant hazard, additional safeguards such as secondary containment, remote sensors, warning sirens, and on-site HazMat responders are sometimes required. Certain facilities with chemicals classified as Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS) are required by federal law to have plans specifically outlining how a release creating off-site impacts will be managed. This preplanning, along with the communication and preparedness activities of the local community, allows many releases at fixed facilities to be managed at the local level.

   However, while the predictability of a fixed facility allows for pre-event mitigation and planning, the prevalence of these facilities suggests that HazMat releases will continue to occur. Regardless of preparedness activities, some events will be too large, too complex, or too remote to be handled at the local level. In these instances, rapid response from state resources will be needed to supplement local assets and ensure an acceptable resolution to the event.

2. **Transportation Incidents –** Though releases at fixed facilities are confined to known geographic areas, transportation HazMat incidents occur virtually anywhere. While these events are somewhat limited in scope due to the quantity of material that can be transported, events involving tractor trailers, rail cars, and ships may involve quantities in excess of those at many fixed facilities. Furthermore, different types of HazMats are often transported together and, depending on the incident, HazMat placards and cargo manifests may be difficult to discern. For this reason, transportation incidents have an increased chance of volatile reactions as a secondary risk to the initial release.

   Close proximity of transportation routes and dense population centers makes the release of even minimal quantities of some HazMats potentially disastrous. Without warning sirens and notification systems that are sometimes available at fixed facilities, timely notifications to the public concerning evacuation or shelter-in-place decisions becomes increasingly difficult. State

assistance will be imperative in helping to safely isolate the incident and provide public health expertise.

3. **Incidents of Unknown Origin (e.g. dumping, abandonment) –** Releases of unknown origin can be challenging because of delayed notification. Often these incidents are caused by illegal dumping or abandonment and the RP may have gone to great lengths to hide the release. As a result, releases of unknown origin may have an extended period in which to contaminate their surroundings and migrate unabated. These types of releases are particularly challenging when waterways have been impacted.

   Incidents of unknown origin may necessitate state assistance during the initial stages when the chemical identity and public impact is still unknown. Furthermore, in the aftermath of a regional disaster such as flooding or severe weather, numerous releases may be discovered. State resources may be needed to supplement local responders for what otherwise may have been routine or manageable events.

B. Vulnerabilities

This section discusses the vulnerable locations, populations, dates/times, and coinciding events that could be affected by a HazMat release.

1. **Locations**

   a. **Urban Areas** – Urban areas provide the largest potential for public impact primarily because of population density and the prevalence of HazMat facilities and transportation routes. These concerns are somewhat offset by the presence of highly evolved emergency response systems and plans. While urban areas tend to have access to more resources to call upon, the size and complexity of potential events can cause local resources to be quickly overwhelmed.

   b. **Rural Areas** – While usually lacking the dense population concerns of an urban environment, rural areas often have limited response capabilities compared to urban areas. Long distances, often coupled with rough terrain, may hamper response efforts and greatly delay arrival of additional resources or mutual aid.

   c. **Inaccessible Areas** – Regardless of proximity to response resources, releases that occur within inaccessible areas may present a unique challenge. Releases involving trains or ships may be inaccessible by road. Events in inaccessible areas may necessitate coordination of water or air resources and assets.

   d. **Lakes, Streams, and Rivers** – Waterborne HazMat releases can quickly become disastrous to both the environment and to sources of water allocated for human consumption and agricultural purposes. These releases travel swiftly over vast areas and their effects on the environment quickly emerge. A massive response to quickly mitigate releases to lakes, streams, and rivers may be required in order to avoid expensive and long-term remediation efforts in the future.

e. **Environmentally Sensitive Areas** – Environmentally sensitive areas are often the most vulnerable to the effects of HazMat releases. Fragile ecologies and rare species may be severely impacted or lost forever if these releases are not carefully managed. Additionally, special care must be taken not to further damage the area through the sudden arrival of large numbers of responders. Impact of the release must be balanced with the negative effects associated with a large-scale response effort involving a rapid influx of personnel and materials to the area.

2. **Populations**

a. **General Public** – Incidents involving large numbers of potentially impacted people require complex coordination to ensure quick and effective dissemination of public information and direction in the event of a shelter-in-place or evacuation decision.

b. **Individual Requiring Additional Assistance (IRAA)** – IRAA populations such as the elderly or disabled require additional support and assistance if evacuation is warranted. These functional needs populations may be unable to self-evacuate and may need to shelter in place until assistance can be provided.

c. **Foreign Cultures/Languages** – Public Information must be tailored to the public's needs and accessible modes of communication. Some cultures may be sensitive to government authority or reluctant to heed advice to leave their homes. Rapid involvement of foreign language media outlets and community or religious leaders may be needed to effectively communicate to specific populations.

d. **Schools and Daycare Facilities** – While many schools possess shelter-in-place or evacuation plans, transportation to a safe location can be challenging. Mobility and functional needs issues compound these challenges. In many cases, managing parents will be the greatest challenge when schools are impacted by a HazMat incident. Because parents' reactions may range from simply seeking information to arriving on scene to look for their children, great effort must be taken to keep parents informed, reduce their apprehension, and ensure that no unnecessary risks or delays occur as a result of their reactions.

e. **Hospitals and Nursing Homes** – Medical facilities are very difficult to evacuate. Unless directly impacted by an immediate threat such as a fire or an internal release, sheltering in place is often preferred. Many patients are non-ambulatory and will require assistance exiting the building. Other patients may be unable to survive without specialized medical equipment that is impractical or impossible to move. As a result, the decision to evacuate a hospital or nursing home must be made with the knowledge that unless detailed preplanning has occurred, some patients may not survive the process.

f. **Jails, Prisons, and Courthouses** – HazMat responses at jails, prisons, police stations, and courthouses presents several planning challenges. Police stations and courthouses often have prisoners and holding cells while jails and prisons often have a population of special needs prisoners as well as a medical facility. At a minimum, prisoners will require additional supervision and transportation assets capable of transporting large numbers of inmates while

ensuring effective control. As with hospitals**,** it is often preferable to have prisons shelter in place rather than evacuate, and preplanning for these circumstances by the facility is imperative.

g. Stadiums – While only a concern when full, stadiums usually lack the ability to shelter occupants in place. As a result, evacuation may be the only option, which may present a challenge as people leave the stadium and attempt to get to their vehicles or leave parking lots. To ensure timely evacuation, preplanning to coordinate vehicular transportation is crucial and should emphasize provisions for IRAA populations**.**

h. Military Installations/Armories – Military installations and armories present special challenges because of the type of equipment and supplies stored or in use.

i. Critical Infrastructure – Critical infrastructure including municipal buildings, dams, power plants, bridges and wastewater treatment plants may not be able to be evacuated. In some cases extra time may be needed to ensure a facility has been secured or safely shutdown before evacuations can occur.

3. Date/Time

a. Nights and Weekends – Non-business hours have the benefit of reduced highway and road activity. However, with the exception of full-time public safety agencies, most responders will need added response time. Additionally, emergency managers and other support agency personnel such as technical experts will have to be called before robust planning and organizing activities can occur.

b. Holidays – Similar to nights and weekends, responders and other assets will have longer response times on holidays. Additionally, many people may be out of town or on vacation, which may limit surge staffing capacity of areas that rely on volunteer departments for response.

c. Rush Hour – Any time large numbers of people are gathered, the risk of a HazMat incident occurring increases. Rush hour compounds the problem by preventing responders and other assets from moving effectively. Drivers may be reluctant to leave their vehicles if instructed or may make the decision on their own, further compounding the traffic problem.

4. Coinciding Events

a. Regional Disasters – Response efforts to a HazMat incident in the wake of or during regional disasters may suffer from a lack of personnel and resources. Responders and other assets will be committed to other operational areas and concerns. Prioritizing activities are challenging for both local governments and the state agencies involved.

b. Spectator Events – Spectator events such as baseball, football**,** and basketball games often involve large numbers of people confined in a stadium and increased traffic congestion. HazMat releases impacting these events will have an added layer of complexity because of the number of people in a geographically compressed area.

c. **Gatherings (e.g. parades, celebrations, etc.)** – Any large gathering of people presents challenges to responders during a HazMat release. Often events such as parades and other celebrations have little or no planning for effective crowd dispersion or communication. Each event is different and requires coordinated response efforts to overcome these challenges.

III. ASSUMPTIONS

Below is a list of assumptions used when constructing this annex:

1) HazMat incidents may occur at any time with little or no warning.
2) HazMat incidents of varying degrees occur frequently.
3) Many HazMat incidents can be handled at the local level.
4) Local responders have some familiarity with HazMat response.
5) Local and regional HazMat response plans exist.
6) Some HazMat incidents will overwhelm local and regional responders.
7) The Commonwealth of Massachusetts will be requested to provide HazMat response support.
8) The Commonwealth of Massachusetts will provide assistance when requested.
9) Along with resources specifically tailored to HazMat response, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has other assets that may be useful when mitigating a HazMat release.
10) At the time of an aid request, state resources may be committed to other emergency response efforts, potentially including coinciding HazMat releases.
11) The state will prioritize its operational needs and deploy or redeploy assets as needed.
12) The state will call upon other mutual aid resources and the federal government as needed.
13) Proper implementation of local plans reduces or prevents releases and related harmful exposures to the public and to the environment.
14) Use of local and outside resources requires careful coordination.
15) Knowledge of hazards and appropriate training lower the potential for HazMat incidents.
16) Protective actions for the general population may include in-place sheltering or evacuation.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

This section details the concept of response operations, including notifications, activation, response operations, and recovery actions.

A. NOTIFICATIONS

Although separate reporting requirements under the MCP require facilities and responsible parties to report to MassDEP and the National Response Center (NRC), emergency responders need only escalate notifications in the event additional resources may be needed. If the incident has the potential to reach a Level 2 or 3 response, MEMA should be notified. The chain of notification is as follows:

1. **Initial Discovery –**A facility operator, first responder, or member of the general public will likely discover the HazMat release.

2. **Local Notification** – Calls from the discovering party to 9-1-1 will be the most likely avenue of local agency notification.

3. **Regional** – Local jurisdictions may call for support from adjacent municipalities or directly to the regional HMRT in accordance with local plans and procedures.

4. **MEMA** – Once the Incident Commander has determined the event to be a Level 2 or 3 emergency, MEMA should be contacted via the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).

5. **MAESF 10 Lead Agencies** – MAESF 10 lead agencies such as the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, the Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP), the Department of Fire Services (DFS), and the Department of Public Health (DPH) will be notified by MEMA if the activation of MAESF 10 is required. These agencies may also have been notified directly by the on-scene Incident Commander in accordance with requests for assistance or support.

6. **MAESF 10 Supporting Agencies** –MEMA will notify agencies with tertiary MAESF-10 roles as needed when it is determined that state action is or may become necessary.

7. **Other State Agencies** – MEMA will notify state agencies without a direct role in MAESF 10 as needed.

8. **Executive Branch** – MEMA will notify the executive branch in accordance with its internal policies and procedures.

9. **Federal Assistance** – MEMA will request federal assistance for a HazMat incident through the Regional Response Team (RRT). Other requests will be coordinated in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Framework (NRF)

10. **Alternate Notification** – Because of MCP reporting requirements for the RP or requests for assistance from the on-scene Incident Commander, MassDEP or DFS may be notified of a HazMat release before MEMA. MassDEP and DFS should notify MEMA if it receives information concerning a release with a high probability of becoming a Level 2 or 3 emergency.

B. ACTIVATION

This plan is activated upon state notification of an actual or potential Level 2 or 3 HazMat emergency. The SEOC will act in coordination with the local emergency management agency or designee and the Incident Commander to determine whether additional state resources are required. Once additional assistance is required or becomes likely, the SEOC will contact the lead agency for MAESF 10 at its discretion. MAESF-10 support agencies and other MAESFs will be requested as needed.

C. RESPONSE OPERATIONS

This section describes the command and control structure and agency responsibilities for response operations.

1. **Command and Control**

   a. **Incident Command System –** The incident will be managed on scene using the Incident Command System (ICS). This system allows responders from multiple agencies and jurisdictions to operate in a coordinated manner with common objectives, communication, and organization.

   b. **Unified Command –** A unified command structure is used when incidents involve several jurisdictions or several agencies from the same political jurisdiction. A unified command structure allows all agencies with responsibilities for an incident, either geographical or functional, to establish a common set of incident objectives and strategies to which all can subscribe. Upon request or arrival, state agencies may form a unified command with the local on-scene Incident Commander.

   c. **State Emergency Operations Center –** The SEOC in Framingham, Massachusetts, provides full-time monitoring and coordination of emergency events. Depending on the size and complexity of the incident, the SEOC will act as a coordinating center between state agencies up to and including full activation of all applicable emergency support functions.

   d. **Massachusetts Emergency Support Function 10 –** The Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs coordinates MAESF 10 – Environmental Protection and Hazardous Materials. MAESF 10 is closely supported by the MassDEP, DFS, and DPH. These core agencies act in coordination with other MAESFs to ensure all aspects of a response are supported. MAESF 10 coordinates closely with MAESF 4 – Firefighting. Through MEMA, MAESF 10 is the conduit through which state resources are channeled into a HazMat incident response.

   e. **Adjacent State and Federal Aid –** In addition to MAESF 10, SEOC can also request adjacent state and federal mutual aid resources. With limited exception, all requests for these resources should be made to the SEOC through the local emergency management agency (EMA) (if activated) or an on-scene MEMA representative if available. In certain cases, municipalities in proximity to other states may have local mutual aid agreements with other local governments in adjoining states. In these cases mutual aid can be requested at the local level. All requests for mutual aid must be approved by the Incident Commander. MEMA will

request federal HazMat response assistance through the federal Regional Response Team (RRT).

f. Hazardous Materials Response Teams – The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has six HazMat response districts (illustrated in Figure 1 below), and each district has an HMRT. These teams have resources staged at various locations throughout their districts to reduce initial response time. HMRTs can be requested directly by the on-scene Incident Commander as needed. HMRTs are an asset of the Department of Fire Services but upon being dispatched to a HazMat incident, HMRTs are included in the on-scene ICS structure.

Figure 1: Regional Hazardous Materials Response Teams (HMRT)



g. Mass Decontamination – Massachusetts has a robust system for mass decontamination of victims. Deployment of specialized mass decontamination units (MDU) is coordinated through the Fire District Control Centers and MEMA Communications section. Depending on the incident, decontamination resources may be sent to the site to provide on-scene decontamination for large numbers of people, while additional resources may be sent directly to hospitals to decontaminate arriving patients.

h. Security – Security operations are primarily a law-enforcement activity and will be coordinated through the on-scene ICS elements and by MAESF 16 (Law Enforcement and Security) at the state level. Depending on the size and nature of the incident, additional security resources may be needed from the Massachusetts National Guard and can be requested through MAESF 13 (Military Support). Security at HazMat releases will often

include keeping and patrolling a perimeter, establishing crowd control, and maintaining the flow of traffic around the incident, as described below:

Perimeter - Security perimeters should be large enough to account for sudden changes in wind direction or the sudden release of a pressurized vessel. While monitoring devices may be used to establish the direction and size of a chemical plume, the perimeter established for human occupancy should extend beyond this zone. While some law enforcement officers are equipped with personal protection equipment (PPE) including gas masks and chemical-resistant clothing, the security perimeter should be established far enough away from the incident that this equipment is not needed.

Crowd Control - Crowd control can be an essential part of a successful HazMat operation, especially if large numbers of contaminated people need decontamination. For proper decontamination to occur, crowds must remain calm and orderly while waiting their turn. This may be especially true at hospitals where large numbers of self-presenting patients may be requesting treatment or decontamination while higher-priority patients arrive from the scene. This scenario may require the deployment of law enforcement personnel to the receiving hospitals.

Traffic Control - Traffic control is usually an issue whenever a perimeter is established. Law enforcement officers trained in traffic management will most likely be required to keep traffic away from the affected area. This will become even more critical during an evacuation when large numbers of people are fleeing an area. In these cases, officers must keep the flow of traffic steadily moving to avoid a gridlock situation.

i. **Evacuation/Shelter in Place** – When a HazMat release impacts or has the ability to impact the nearby population, a shelter-in-place or evacuation decision must be made. While these two activities are simple in theory, they can be immensely complicated in practice. As a result, local and regional responders and officials must have adequate plans and resources for either. Shelter-in-place and evacuation decisions are made by the on-scene Incident Commander but may require significant state resources. These options are briefly discussed below:

Shelter-in-Place – Sheltering in place within homes or businesses may be less complicated and quicker than an evacuation; however, time becomes a factor as the HazMat plume may slowly begin permeating buildings and people become increasingly uncomfortable without air conditioning or heat. Nonetheless, sheltering in place may be the safest option while a coordinated evacuation plan is developed and IRAA populations can be assisted.

Evacuation – In incidents involving a limited number of people, evacuating the area can be quick and efficient. An evacuation ensures that the public will have no contact with the release and gives the Incident Commander time to more thoroughly assess the situation before making entry decisions. Additionally, when an incident involves a transportation accident or a facility equipped with a siren or communications system,

self-evacuations may already have occurred. Depending on the size of the impacted area and the inclusion of IRAA populations (such as hospitals, prisons, and schools), evacuations may become extremely long or arduous and an evacuation may prompt people to leave their homes or businesses and become immediately exposed to the released chemical. In these instances, sheltering in place may be a more effective solution.

j. Public Information – All public information concerning state assets or responses must be coordinated through either the on-scene Public Information Officer (PIO) or the SEOC and MAESF 14 (Public Information) in accordance with MEMA's public information procedures. In addition, the Incident Commander must approve all information disseminated regarding that specific incident. During certain complex events, PIOs from the state level may be requested on scene. In the event that PIOs are requested, requests will be coordinated through the SEOC or MAESF 14 (Public Information) as necessary.

k. Other – All other resources, needs, and requests will be handled through the SEOC or appropriate MAESF. MEMA will serve as the coordinating agency for all additional state or federal resource requests and will ensure timely requests for information or resources between the MAESFs.

2. Agency Responsibilities

a. Responsibilities of Primary Agency – MEMA is the primary Massachusetts agency responsible for coordination of state resources. MEMA will:

- Work with federal, state, and local agencies to identify potential emergencies, mitigate risks, and support response and remediation efforts if necessary
- Notify federal response authorities and other required state authorities as needed
- Coordinate state-level response activities and resources based on MAESF structures
- Track response expenditures, file appropriate reports and financial statements, and coordinate post-incident reimbursement procedures

b. Responsibilities of Support Agencies – In addition to those responsibilities already cited, support agencies shall provide the following special resources or capabilities:

1. The Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs will:

    a. Manage overall efforts of MAESF 10

    b. Ensure that requests for state and federal assistance through MAESF 10 are directed to the appropriate requesting agency

c. Coordinate with MassDEP to ensure an efficient transition to the recovery phase

2. The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) will:

    a. Work in conjunction with the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs to coordinate efforts of MAESF 10

    b. Ensure a successful transition to response and recovery guidance under the MCP

    c. Provide technical and scientific support

    d. Provide limited HazMat response PPE and equipment as available

3. Massachusetts State Police will:

    a. Provide support for security coverage and access to the incident site if needed

    b. Facilitate transportation of required assets to and from the incident site and/or staging areas

    c. Field and support requests for Bomb Squad resources

    d. As directed, establish and maintain traffic control and staging area discipline

4. Massachusetts Department of Fire Services (DFS) will:

    a. Provide HazMat support to contain, confine, and control releases of HazMat releases as requested

    b. Coordinate response of HMRT and MDU

    c. Perform estimates of the downwind hazard

    d. Determine the nature of and identify the hazard

    e. Execute site management and site safety functions

    f. Coordinate emergency decontamination of victims

    g. Execute technical decontamination of responders

5. Massachusetts Department of Public Health (DPH) will:

    a. Assess human exposure to chemical agents by analyzing clinical specimens for contaminants of concern and/or their metabolites

    b. Carry out testing of environmental and clinical samples for chemical or radioactive materials related to the incident

c. Deploy Chempack stockpiles in response to specific hazardous materials releases

d. Deploy the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and local pharmaceutical caches as necessary

e. Engage federal partners to assist with testing of environmental and clinical samples related to the incident

f. Evaluate both short and long-term potential health impacts from exposure and from contamination of food, water, and soil

g. Evaluate environmental data for possible health impacts that will inform appropriate actions

h. Provide technical and scientific support such as from the Field Assessment Support Team (FAST) and laboratory support from the Wall Experiment Station (WES)

i. Facilitate recovery process to include disposal of impacted food, cleanup of indoor spaces, evaluation of housing, and provision of risk communication for the public

j. Identify vulnerable populations in the affected area to inform evacuation and long-term treatment issues

k. If feasible, conduct health surveillance activities to determine health impact of the release

l. Notify and work with healthcare facilities to respond to event

m. Provide laboratory identification of unknown chemicals and confirmation of field screening results

n. Provide safety guidance for first responders and the public

o. Work with MassDEP, HazMat teams, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other partners to determine environmental pathways (air, water, soil, and food) for contamination and evaluate human exposure potential that may lead to recommendations for sampling

6. Massachusetts National Guard may provide:

a. Civil Support Teams (CST) chemical response team to augment HazMat personnel and provide chemical support

b. Basic needs equipment/supplies (e.g. food, water, tents, etc.)

c. Decontamination capability

d. Engineer units

e. Helicopters

f. Scene security

g. Water purification

c. Responsibilities of Federal Government. Federal responsibilities are outlined in the NRF and the NIMS. Federal resources are available specifically for incidents that expand beyond available local, state, and mutual aid resources.

D. RECOVERY ACTIONS

Once the response phase of a HazMat release is complete, recovery actions and remediation activities often continue for months or years. Depending on the incident, the recovery action process is usually overseen by MassDEP in conjunction with the EPA and other agencies as warranted. These actions are outlined in the MCP.

In order to transition from the response phase to the recovery phase, the Incident Commander--in conjunction with the Safety Officer and HazMat Branch Chief--must be reasonably certain that no immediate threat to health and safety, personal property, or the environment remains. This standard applies to immediate hazards and does not include elevated risks from exposure to long-term pollution or contamination, which fall under the MCP.

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